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PLAINTIFF'S REQUIREMENT OF DUE CARE IN
PRIVATE 10b-5 ACTIONS: THE EFFECT OF
ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER
Lacking any clear statutory guidelines to the imposition of private
recovery under rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 the
courts have formulated several prerequisites to the remedy on a case-by-
case basis.2 Along with requiring materiality, 3 reliance,4 and recently,
scienter,5 an increasing number of courts demand a showing of caution
and diligence on the part of an investor who claims to have been the
victim of securities fraud.6
1. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 pur-
suant to § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made; not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
2. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,730 (1975); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care UnderRule 10b-5:
An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 561,566 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Wheeler).
3. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1975); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
4. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600
(1977); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
993 (1976). This element provides the causal link between a defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injuries. Actual reliance need no longer be shown where an omission is alleged.
See notes 72-73 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); text accompanying notes 83-
86 infra.
6. Eight circuits so far have found the conduct of the plaintiff to be relevant in
determining l0b-5 liability. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 225 (1977); Hirsh v. Du Point, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.
1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977);
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This requirement of due care, or due diligence, has been described by
the courts in a variety of ways.' However, there is agreement that the
aggrieved party to a transaction must have used common sense and acted
reasonably in assessing the information available to him,8 and must have
exercised a certain amount of effort to discover any further relevant
facts. 9 In other words, a claimant must show that the fraud was commit-
ted in spite of his own reasonable attempts to protect his interests.10 The
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d
402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d
414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co., 446
F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966). See also NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank,
[Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); McLean v. Alexan-
der, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976); Hutto v. Texas Income Properties Corp., 416 F.
Supp. 478 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal.
1975); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Chelsea
Assocs. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Taylor v. Smith, Burney & Co.,
358 F. Supp. 892 (D. Utah 1973); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill.
1971). Contra, Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970). See also 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE IOB-5,
8.4 (544), at 204.178 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
7. Various terms have been used by the courts to denote substantially the same
requirement of caution and care by the plaintiff. See Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("due diligence"); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 623 (5th Cir. 1974) ("duty of
reasonable investigation"); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976) ("duty of due care"); see also Wheeler, supra note 2, at
563 n.7.
For purposes of this comment, the term "due care" will be used to describe this
requirement but not to refer to any particular standard of care by the plaintiff.
8. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,409 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993
(1976); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 231 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, 345 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir.
1965); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1079 (D. Del. 1976).
9. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1975); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354
F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Cf. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1079
(D. Del. 1976) (plaintiff was justified in relying on a certified accounting statement without
making an independent investigation into its factual basis); Hutto v. Texas Income
Properties Corp., 416 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (plaintiff not required to
continually investigate throughout a prolonged negotiation after a basic agreement is
reached).
10. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d
402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp.
1057 (D. Del. 1976).
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courts will hold a plaintiff to the standard of care of a reasonable person
acting in similar circumstances and in possession of a similar amount of
experience and sophistication in the investment field. 
To compel private claimants under rule 1 Ob-5 to exercise due care not
only encourages investor caution in securities transactions,12 but also
reduces the number of lOb-5 claims. 13 Until recently, when the Supreme
Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 4 held that scienter was required for
any private lOb-5 recovery, 15 the circuits were split as to the standard of
liability to be imposed.16 For example, a plaintiff's lack of care has been
used to bar recovery in actions based upon defendant's negligence as well
as in actions where defendant's knowing conduct falls short of specific
intent to harm. 17
However, the Hochfelder decision has raised strong doubts as to the
continuing validity of any examination of the victim's conduct where it
would bar recovery for knowing or intentional fraud.' 8 Although the
11. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1077 (D. Del. 1976). The standard is basically an
objective one based on the knowledge and status of the plaintiff at the time of the
transaction.
12. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976).
13. In recent years the scope of recovery under rule lob-5 has been greatly expanded by
the courts through a broadening of the definition of a security, an elimination of the privity
requirement, and a relaxation of the purchaser-seller rule. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551
F.2d 1005, 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540
F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057,
1077 (D. Del. 1976). See also Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiff Under
Rule lob-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753,753 [hereinafter cited as DUKE]; 1 BROMBERG, supra note
6, § 2.5(6) (more litigation has been brought under rule lob-5 than all other antifraud
provisions combined).
14. 425 U.S. 185 (1976), rev'g 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
15. Id. at 193.
16. At the time the Supreme Court handed down the Hochfelder decision, the circuits
were in dispute on the issue of the proper standard of liability for lOb-5 actions. Three
circuits required scienter. Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d
Cir. 1973). Two circuits indicated that they might require scienter. Carras v. Burns, 516
F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407-08 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). Three circuits had held that scienter would not be
required. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) ("flexible duty" standard for
defendant, based on circumstances shown); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,734-35 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637, 642 (7th
Cir. 1963) (dicta). See Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter UnderRule
lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 231 (1977).
17. See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 83-150 infra and accompanying text.
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courts have been divided since Hochfelder, the majority have continued
to recognize some standard of care for plaintiffs in private 1Ob-5 ac-
tions) 9 The decisions indicate that, for policy reasons, victims of securi-
ties fraud will continue to be required to show they did not act with
reckless disregard in the circumstances before recovery is allowed.2°
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DUE CARE REQUIREMENT:
THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Common Law Analysis
Because the courts have often turned to the common law as a guide to
interpreting rule 10b-5, 2' it is a logical place to start an analysis of the
theoretical support for the due care requirement. Common law tort theory
distinguished intentional misrepresentations made with a specific intent
to harm 22 from negligent misrepresentations made without intent to
deceive or knowledge of their falsity.23 Where a defendant was merely
negligent in misrepresenting or in omitting relevant facts, any corres-
ponding negligence of the claimant would bar recovery under contribu-
tory negligence concepts.24 However, where a defendant intentionally
19. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 225 (1977) (due care defense held unavailable to bar an intentional tort, but plaintiff's
due care used to determine nonreliance); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977) (dicta) (plaintiff's gross conduct may bar recovery); Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank,
[Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); McLean v. Alexan-
der, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
20. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp.
1057 (D. Del. 1976). *
21. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
22. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 699 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]; Wheeler, supra note 2, at 576 & n.44. The tort of intentional misrepre-
sentation was the basis of the common law fraud or deceit action. See Derry v. Peek, 14
App. Cas. 337 (H.L. 1889).
23. The tort of negligent misrepresentation, which modified the action of deceit, was a
later development of the common law. See PROSSER, supra note 22, at 705; Wheeler,
supra note 2, at 577.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A (1977). See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d
Cir. 1976) (dicta); Wheeler, supra note 2, at 577.
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inflicted harm, carelessness by the injured party would be irrelevant to
liability. 25 But a limited defense would lie at common law where the
misrepresentations were patently false, or the claimant had actual knowl-
edge of the truth.26
Such common law distinctions, if directly applied to rule lOb-5 ac-
tions, would appear to restrict the availability of a due care defense to
cases resting upon a finding of negligence. But motivated by strong
policy considerations surrounding the securities laws, the courts have
tempered the common law and applied the defense more broadly than in
traditional tort actions.
Until recently, only one court had used common law distinctions to
hold the plaintiff's lack of due care irrelevant to liability under rule 1Ob-5
for intentional misrepresentation or fraud.27 Since most circuits prior to
Hochfelder had required some degree of scienter,28 courts had examined
due care in situations which usually were not within the bounds of
common law contributory negligence. Due care was not only considered
relevant where knowing conduct was found,2 9 but was also discussed in
25. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 225 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
1600 (1977); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1003 (1970) (apparently rejecting due care limitation on rule lOb-5). See Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977). See also Wheeler, supra note 2,
at 577. Contra, Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Mitchell v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Clement A.
Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
Prosser states that "where there is an intent to mislead . . . , [barring recovery] is
clearly inconsistent with the general rule that mere negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense to an intentional tort. The better reasoned cases have rejected contributory
negligence as a defense applicable to intentional deceit.... .- PROSSER, supra note 22; §
108, at 716. Section 545A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977) states, "One
who justifiably relies upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not barred from recovery by
his contributory negligence in doing so."
26. Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1904); See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1977); PROSSER, supra note 22, at 716; Wheeler, supra note 2, at
577 n.50, 578 n.52; BROMBERG, supra note 6, 8.4 (652), at 204.248 (1977).
27. Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003
(1970). However in the year and a half following Hochfelder, two other cases have used
common law distinctions to find due care irrelevant to lob-5 recovery. Sundstrand Corp.
v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 225 (1977);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 99-121 infra for further discussion.
28. See note 16 supra.
29. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491
F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Clement A. Evans & Co.
v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
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circumstances where the court failed to find the defendant liable at all. 30
But only rarely has the due care standard been applied to bar recovery
where the defendant had the specific intent to harm required for an action
in common law fraud. 3' Thus the defense of lack of due care has
heretofore usually been limited to defendants whose conduct falls short
of common law fraud.
3 2
B. Policy Considerations
The Securities Exchange Act of 19343 (the Act) was enacted in order
to eliminate a wide range of abuses in the securities field by promoting
"ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing." 3 4 The Act was part of a
comprehensive legislative scheme designed to better protect investors
from fraud by requiring full disclosure and honest dealing in both public
and private securities transactions.
35
30. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975);
Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); McGraw v.
Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc., 377
F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich.
1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp.
1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
31. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
993 (1976); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). Specific intent to defraud involves an intent to harm the
plaintiff and thus is considered more culpable than conduct carried out knowingly but
without any conscious intent to cause injury. In lOb-5 actions courts rarely analyze
specific intent to defraud because their analysis stops when knowing conduct sufficient to
meet scienter requirements is found.
32. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 581-82.
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 80b-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
34. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934) and H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933)). Accord,
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 800-01 (5th Cir. 1970).
35.-Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292, 1302-03 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Section 2 of the Act reflects legislative cognizance of the need for
regulation:
[Transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices
and matters related thereto . . . in order to protect interstate commerce . . . and to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions . . ..
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In section 10(b) of the Act, Congress vested broad rule-making power
in the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
enable the latter to police the investment market and punish any future
"manipulative or deceptive" practices. 6 Pursuant-to section 10(b), the
SEC promulgated rule lOb-5, which prohibits fraud in the sale of securi-
ties by means of making untrue statements or omitting material facts.3
7
Although the rule was intended as a mechanism for administrative ac-
tions against fraud, the courts have read into it a private cause of action.
38
Correspondingly, various common law defenses,39 particularly lack of
due care by the victim,' have become available in such private actions.
Since private remedies under rule lOb-5 lack legislative guidance, it
has been entirely proper for the courts to define the parameters of such
15 U.S.C. § 78b (Supp. V 1975). In a message to Congress concerning the Act, President
Roosevelt saw the need to correct abuses in national security exchange trading:
It is my belief that exchanges for dealing in securities and commodities are neces-
sary and of definite value to our commercial and agricultural life. Nevertheless, it
should be our national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use of these exchanges
for purely speculative operations.
I therefore recommend to the Congress the enactment of legislation providing for
the regulation by the Federal Government of the operations of exchanges dealing in
securities and commodities for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of
values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise
and destructive speculation.
78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
37. See note I supra.
38. See note 2 supra.
39. The defenses judicially implied by rule lOb-5 include: (I) laches, waiver and estop-
pel, which are usually treated as a group; (2) in pai delicto, which arises in the rare
situations where both parties are'found to be equally at fault, as where the victim actively
participated in the defendant's wrongdoing; and (3) statute of limitations. Since occasional
judicial examination of a plaintiff's diligence in discovering the fraud focuses upon a
victim's care after the fraud has been perpetrated, it is easily distinguishable from the duty
of care discussed in this comment, which involves diligence to avoid allowing the fraud in
the first place. See DUKE, supra note 13, at 562 & nn.4-6, for a general discussion of
common law defenses to lOb-5 actions.
40. The defense of lack of due care can be distinguished from an in pari delicto defense
in that the latter involves an affirmative, knowing participation in a lOb-5 violation, while
lack of due care is passive inaction by the victim, whose carelessness allows the fraud to
be perpetrated under his nose.
1977]
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recovery. 41 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, policy considera-
tions play an important role in "flesh[ing] out" the securities laws where
congressional guidance is lacking, as it clearly is in private actions under
rule 10b-5.42
A common justification for imposing the duty of due care is the need to
tighten the requirements for private lOb-5 recovery in order to help
reduce the vast number of claims brought under the rule. 43 The due care
requirement effectively limits potential liability and bars many claimants
who have exhibited as much carelessness as the defendant, or who have
acted in bad faith. Rule 10b-5 actions must be brought in good faith in
order to avoid use of that provision as an-"insurance policy" by unsuc-
cessful investors.*4
Some courts out of a policy of fairness have prevented a careless or
incautious victim of securities fraud from recovering damages for injuries
of which he was not wholly innocent. 45 An analogous principle in equity
41. The Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), conceded this when it stated:
[A]s we have pointed out, we are not dealing here with any private right created by the
express language of §10(b) or of Rule 10b-5. No language in either of those provisions
speaks at all to the contours of a private cause of action for their violation. . . . We
are dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially found to exist, and
will have to be judicially delimited one way or another unless and until Congress
addresses the question.
Id. at 748-49.
42. Id. at 737. Accord, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151-52
(1972); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,235 (2d Cir.
1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 800-01 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976); Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). This has
also been the justification behind the seller-purchaser rule, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), and the imposition of the
requirement of scienter, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
44. McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1972). There the court stated,
"An investor who casually makes investments, and who blindly rides bubbles until they
burst, does so at his own risk, and cannot later invoke § 10(b) as a form of 'investor's
insurance.' " Id. at 92. Accord, Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v.
Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). In Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962), the court stated, "The
purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to protect the innocent investor, not one who
loses his innocence and then waits to see how his investment turns out before he decides
to invoke the provisions of the Act."
45. See Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.
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is that a party will be denied relief where he himself has not done
equity. 46 Even where a defendant's conduct was intentional, a few courts
will still look to the overall fairness of the transaction and bar recovery on
the basis of the claimant's own lack of care. 47
One of the strongest judicial policies behind the securities laws is the
promotion of investor carefulness. By requiring that all claimants under
rule 10b-5 act cautiously and take reasonable precautions to prevent
fraud, the courts not only encourage investor self-protection, but help
promote the anti-fraud purposes underlying the Act as well.48
Punishment of the defendant only minimally justifies the imposition of
private remedies under rule lOb-5. 49 Since private recovery is based on
the amount of injury rather than on the defendant's mental state, it is not
suitable as a form of primary punishment for securities fraud. 0 Instead,
private remedies compensate for injuries suffered as a result of a defend-
ant's fraudulent conduct. Thus, the due care requirement furthers these
restorative purposes by barring recovery for injuries that were not caused
solely by the defendant, but were aided in part by the claimant's own
carelessness. The defense of due care would therefore not unjustly affect
the interests of the investor who had exercised caution and diligence; it
would only bar the careless or bad faith claimant from unfairly profiting
from the situation.
5'
Cal. 1975); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other
grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc., 377 F. Supp.
690 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
aff'd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048
(S.D. Fla. 1973); Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
46. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 584.
47. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Clement A. Evans
& Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
Contra, Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600
(1977); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003
(1970).
48. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977).
49. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
50. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 585 & n.75. Wheeler notes that "relatively minimal
involvement [by a defendant] might nevertheless lead to tremendous damage exposure."
A further indication of the purposes behind rule lOb-5 is the refusal of the courts to award
punitive damages in private lOb-5 actions. See, e.g., Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259-60
(4th Cir. 1975). Section 28 of the Act restricts recovery under the Act to actual damages.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1970).
51. Compare Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312
(1977), and McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976) with Jackson v.
Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d
Cir. 1976) and Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
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While promoting these restorative purposes, the courts that permit the
defense are not ignoring the culpability of the defendant or letting him go
unpunished. 52 Criminal penalties and injunctive relief are specifically
covered elsewhere in the securities laws, providing adequate mechanisms
for the punishment and deterrence of fraudulent conduct.5 3 To bar a
private claimant's recovery because of a failure to exercise due care is not
to say that the defendant did not violate rule lOb-5-just that whatever
violations occured cannot be compensated for because of the claimant's
own culpability.-' The ultimate responsibility for punishment of such a
defendant can then be left up to criminal or administrative agencies.
55
C. Early Judicial Application of Due Care
Although the duty of due care has been applied to public transactions
carried out through stock exchanges ,56 the majority of cases imposing the
duty have involved private, face-to-face transactions,5 7 where there is
usually a greater opportunity to exercise care to avoid being defrauded.
58
Since the plaintiff is often charged with knowledge of all information to
which he had access-either because it was readily available or because
it could have been discovered by reasonable investigation 9 -the circum-
52. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 585-86.
53. See §§ 21, 32 of the Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78ff (1970)).
54. The SEC has stated that civil remedies will not always follow from lOb-5 violations.
See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 586 n.77 (citing Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, cert. granted, 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
55. Wheeler notes that as a practical matter public officials have only limited manpower
available to police and punish all 10b_-5 violations and thus reliance upon the judicial
system is often necessary as well as helpful. Consequently, the possibility of private
actions for damages is an important factor in the enforcement of the anti-fraud provisions.
Wheeler, supra note 2, at 586 & n.79; see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir.
1970).
56. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
57. See, e.g., Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,
491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 933 (1976); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411
F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 596-97.
59. See id. at 598; notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text. One recent case determined
the point at which the duty to investigate will end. Hutto v. Texas Income Properties
Corp., 416 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Texas 1976). Even though the plaintiff had failed to
adequately investigate before the agreement was reached, the court found that the fraud
could not have been detected at that time, since it appeared only later during the prolonged
negotiations prior to the actual transfer. The court held that in such instances of prolonged
negotiations following an initial agreement, the plaintiff's duty to investigate will begin at
the "initial contact between buyer and seller and continu[e] only until such time as an
agreement to purchase is reached . . . ." Id. at 483. It would not be necessary for a
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stances surrounding the transaction play an important part in the success
or failure of the defense.
1. Use of Due Care to Determine the Defendant's Duty to Disclose
The courts have taken various approaches to the requirement of due
care in private 1Ob-5 actions. One approach ties the plaintiff's conduct to
the threshold question of the defendant's duty to disclose, and the
exposure of the conduct to lOb-5 liability. 6 In such cases, liability is
conditioned upon the claimant's lack of knowledge of the relevant infor-
mation. Where the exercise of a reasonable amount of care should have
led the plaintiff to the true facts, the defendant has no duty under rule
10b-5 to disclose the information. 61 Under such an approach, the plain-
tiff's sophistication in financial affairs, or his position as an insider to a
company's business, will play an important role in determining what
information he should have been aware of without its specific disclo-
sure. 6
2
One of the problems with this approach is that it fails to separate the
defendant's liability from the plaintiff's right to recover. 63 Liability under
rule lOb-5 should be independently based upon the defendant's culpabili-
ty; avoidance of that liability being a separate determination based upon
the availability of several defenses. When the issue of a plaintiff's due
care affects the determination of liability, the result is often that a
plaintiff to continue investigating throughout the negotiation period unless circumstances
arise to put a reasonable person on notice of a need for further inquiry. Id.
60. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975);
Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); City
Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Hafner v.
Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1963); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd,
527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
61. See, e.g., Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.
1975) (no duty to disclose information which the defendants knew plaintiffs could have
found out from available transfer sheets); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (no duty to disclose an audit report of the
company books and records to which the plaintiff had unimpeded access); Chelsea
Assocs. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.
1975) (no duty to inform plaintiff of facts of which its representative was already aware).
62. See City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
63. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312
(1977).
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defendant escapes all liability rather than merely avoiding the burden of
rectifying the losses suffered.
Another problem with this approach is that it fails to impose a uniform
standard of culpability upon defendants, since a defendant's duty will
vary according to the status of the plaintiff and the circumstances of the
transaction. Thus, where the plaintiff is a sophisticated investor or
corporate insider, the defendant's duty to disclose the relevant facts will
be much lower than it would be were the plaintiff unsophisticated or the
action part of an SEC proceeding.' 4 However, the policy of furthering
high ethical standards in the securities field indicates that the duty of full
disclosure is owed to the public as a whole, not to any particular
investor.65 It follows that the status of a claimant should not alter the duty
of disclosure mandated by rule 10b-5. Imposing the due care requirement
to alter a defendant's duty according to the type of proceeding brought or
the status of the victim, will inevitably produce confusion and inconsis-
tency, and will allow defendants to engage -in "gamesmanship" in
carrying out their obligation to disclose.
66
2. Infusion of Due Care into the Reliance Requirement
A second approach employed by the courts has been to intertwine due
care with the requirements of reliance and materiality. 67 Some courts
have thus confused the finding of reliance on misstatements or omis-
sions-the fact which establishes causation 6 8-with the determination of
64. See City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
Recently, in Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312
(1977), the Fifth Circuit noted this'inherent inconsistency between the standards imposed
upon defendants in private actions under rule lOb-5, and those imposed upon defendants
in SEC enforcement proceedings:
Because the private lOb-5 cause of action derives from a prohibitory SEC rule, the
standard of conduct for defendants logically should be the same whether the SEC or a
private litigant enforces the duty. In an SEC enforcement proceeding, the due care of
the victim generally does not receive consideration.
Id. at 1015. See also SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974) (victim's status as a
knowledgeable investor disregarded); Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1967) (victim's
sophistication disregarded).
65. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977).
66. Id. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 591.
67. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Ferland v. Orange
Groves of Fla. Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
358 F. Supp. 892 (D. Utah 1973); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.
Fla. 1973). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC
Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584 (1975).
68. See citations note 6 supra.
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whether the plaintiff should have relied on defendant's actions-some-
thing that is more properly a policy decision. 69 The two inherently
separate questions of due care and reliance have been merged by some
courts -into the single requirement of "reasonable reliance."7 Where a
plaintiff fails to take the care which his background and the immediate
circumstances call for, the reliance is deemed unreasonable and proof of
causal connection fails.
7 1
The difficulty with applying this approach lies not only in its obfusca-
tion of the difference between reliance and due care, but in the inconsis-
tencies which result. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,72 the
Supreme Court ruled that where omissions are alleged under rule lOb-5,
individual reliance need no longer be proved once it is shown that the
omissions were material.73 As a result, in omissions cases those courts
tying due care to reliance will avoid assessing the plaintiff's degree of
69. Comment b of § 545A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS makes an important
distinction between "justifiableness" of the plaintiff's reliance on a particular misrepre-
sentation or omission, and his contributory negligence (lack of due care) in doing so:
Although the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentation must be justifiable, ...
this does not mean that his conduct must conform to the standard of the reasonable
man. Justification is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular
plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of
a community standard of conduct to all cases. Negligent reliance and action some-
times will not be justifiable, and the recovery will be barred accordingly.; but this is
not always the case. There will be cases in which a plaintiff may be justified in relying
upon the representation, even though his conduct in doing so does not conform to the
community standard of knowledge, intelligence, judgement or care. Thus, under the
rule stated in § 540, the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not required to
investigate its truth, even when a reasonable man of ordinary caution would do so
before taking action; and it is only when he knows of the falsity or it is obvious to him
that his reliance is not justified.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A, Comment b (1977). See generally Wheeler,
supra note 2, at 592-93.
70. See Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892 (D. Utah 1973); Branham v.
Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See generally Comment, Reliance
Under Rule lob-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 562
(1972).
71. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (reliance on a deceptive press release unjustified when a subsequent
truthful one had since been issued); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 212
(N.D. II1. 1971) (plaintiff's reliance unreasonable since as an experienced investor making
a large investment he should have exercised greater care in discovering the true facts).
72. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
73. Id. at 153. See also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976).
Some commentators contend that proof of materiality raises a presumption of reliance
which is rebuttable by a showing that the plaintiff would not have appreciated the
importance of the information even if disclosure was made. See Ruder & Cross, Limita-
tions on Civil Liability under Rule lob-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1134-38.
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care altogether.74 However, due care would continue to be applied in
misrepresentation cases, which in fact have no greater policy reasons for
the requirement of due care than omission cases do. 75 Such inconsistency
would allow a claimant to escape his duty of care merely by alleging an
omission. This situation can be alleviated only by treating due care as a
completely separate requirement, producing a clear and constant duty of
care by the plaintiff regardless of the nature of the allegations. 76
3. Use of Due Care as a Separate Element
A third approach to the due care requirement is to regard it as a
separate element of recovery under rule 1 Ob-5, entirely independent from
proof of reliance or a determination of defendant liability. 7" Commen-
tators argue that this is the far superior approach.78 Since the issue of
liability is settled prior to an examination of the plaintiff's conduct, the
defendant's duty to disclose remains unaltered by the status or knowledge
of the claimant. Rather than dispute the legality of the defendant's acts, a
successful defense would bar recovery because of the claimant's own
carelessness in helping to bring about the harm. This approach more
clearly aligns the use of the due care requirement with policy considera-
tions stressing investor watchfulness and the use of rule 10b-5 privately
for primarily restorative purposes.
Unfortunately, it is unclear which party will have the burden of
proving or disproving the plaintiff's due care. While a few courts have
treated the duty of due care as an affirmative defense to be raised by the
defendant, 79 in one case it was held to be part of the plaintiff's case.80
74. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312
(1977).
75. Id.
76. See McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 & n.112 (D. Del. 1976);
Wheeler, supra note 2, at 594.
77. See Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112
(5th Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 993 (1976); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 1973); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 594; DUKE, supra note 13, at 760 (approach called
"theoretically impeccable").
79. Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 988 (1971) (affirmative defenses-presumably due care-held available in lob-5
actions); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (due care
raised as an affirmative defense, though court also tied due care to reliance).
80. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
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Most courts, however, do not state whether they are looking at the
plaintiff's conduct in the context of his case, or at proof raised by the
defendant.81 With increased recognition of the due care requirement,
courts can be expected to define more clearly the procedural aspects of its
implementation. 8 2 Applying due care as an affirmative defense may
assure its isolation from the issue of the plaintiff's reliance or the liability
of the defendant, and thus allow its use to bar recovery under rule lOb-5
much like the defenses of estoppel and waiver.
I. JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF DUE CARE
FOLLOWING Hochfelder
In early 1976, the Supreme Court announced in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder83 that negligence would not be a valid basis for lOb-5
recovery, and that in order to establish liability, a defendant must be
shown to have had an "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 84 The
Court expressly left open the question of whether reckless disregard85
would satisfy the scienter requirement, although it noted that "[i]n
certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of
intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.' '86
Despite ambiguities in the Court's definition of "scienter," commen-
tators and courts have generally agreed that the Hochfelder standard
embraces more than specific intent to deceive, and that mere knowledge
of falsity8 7 or reckless disregard for the truth 8 will be enough for
81. See, e.g., Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491
F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1975); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom,
422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
82. There is some indication that the duty of due care may have ramifications on the
scope of discovery in securities cases. In Zucker v. Sable, 72 F.R.D. I (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
the court held that a plaintiff's investment history is "clearly relevant" to the defendant's
case since, where sophisticated investors are seeking recovery, such information can
establish a lack of due care on the plaintiff's part. Id. at 4.
83. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
84. Id. at 193.
85. "Recklessness" in the securities field is defined by David Ruder as "acts in
conscious disregard of, or indifference to, the risk that [victims of a misrepresentation or
omission] will be misled." Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and
State of Mind in Rule lOb-S Purchase and Sales Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423,436 (1968).
Recklessness generally connotes a type of aggravated negligence which differs in quality
rather than degree from ordinary negligence. The actor has intentionally disregarded a
known risk from which it was highly probable that harm would follow. See PROSSER,
supra note 22, at 184-85. See generally 3 BROMBERG, supra note 6, 8.4(570), at 204.208.
86. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
87. See Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5:
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 226-27, 235 (1977).
88. Saunders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792-93 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand
138 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
liability. Several cases following Hochfelder have grappled with the
effect of the scienter standard upon the requirement of due care.
The first such case was Straub v. Vaisman & Co. ,89 decided by the
Third Circuit shortly after Hochfelder. Suit under rule lOb-5 had been.
brought by several foreign nationals against a securities broker which had
allegedly failed to disclose material facts during a stock transfer. 9 The
district court found specific intent to defraud, but the defendants argued
that the plaintiffs' failure to investigate the financial conditions of the
company adequately before investing should bar recovery.
91
The Third Circuit held that after Hochfelder a plaintiff still must
exercise due care in the particular circumstances in order to recover under
rule lOb-5. 92 The court recognized that by analogy to the common law,
the Hochfelder requirement of scienter should severely limit the use of
lack of due care as a defense. 93 The court also noted that the rise of the
doctrine of comparative negligence has raised doubts as to the validity of
a policy which "den[ies] all recovery to a defrauded plaintiff who was
only somewhat careless or understandably trusting."
94
Despite these doubts, the court found the legislative and judicial
policies underlying the defense-encouraging investor caution and integ-
rity-too strong to be overruled. 95 As a result, the court imposed a
"flexible duty" standard of care on plaintiffs, to be measured by the
circumstances of each case, such as the relationship between the parties,
the sophistication of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's opportunity to
discover the fraud or obtain access to the truth.96 The court expressly
placed the burden of showing lack of due care upon the defendants, to be
raised as an affirmative defense rather than as part of the plaintiff's
case.97 The court concluded that, under the circumstances shown, the
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 225
(1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 & n.23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 98 S. Ct. 312
(1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1976); McLean v.
Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1080-81 (D. Del. 1976). See also Bucklo, The Supreme
Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29
STAN. L. REV. 213, 235-36 (1977).
89. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
90. Id. at 594.
91. Id. at 596.
92. Id. at 598.
93. Id. at 597. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
94. 540 F.2d at 597.
95. Id. at 597-98.
96. Id. at 598.
97. Id.
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plaintiffs had acted with reasonable care and that lack of diligence had
not been established.
98
A few months after Straub was decided, the Tenth Circuit in
Holdsworth v. Strong99 held that in light of the requirement of scienter
imposed by Hochfelder, due care would no longer be available as a
defense in private 10b-5 actions."° The suit was brought by one corpo-
rate insider against another, who had allegedly misrepresented the finan-
cial position of a close corporation in order to induce the plaintiff to sell
his stock. ' 0' The trial court had little trouble finding that the defendant
had knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the facts to the plain-
tiff. 102
Examining common law distinctions between negligence as a defense
to negligent misrepresentation and its availability against intentional
misrepresentation, the court held that a plaintiff's lack of due care would
be "irrational and unrelated" to lOb-5 actions based on fraud. 03 The
court noted that "[s]ince the plaintiff must prove his case in terms of the
standard of scienter, doubts are cast on its usefulness where it allows the
fraudulent actor to escape liability by saying that if the plaintiff had been
diligent, he would not have allowed himself to be cheated."""° The court
found nothing in either the language of rule lOb-5 or the Hochfelder
decision to indicate that the defense should continue to be applied in the
face of intentional conduct.10 5 Only where the intentional misrepresenta-
tion was patently false would a plaintiff have the duty to investigate
before relying on it."° Nevertheless, the actions of the plaintiff might be
a defense if they were "gross conduct somewhat comparable to that of
98. Id. The court found that the transaction had been specifically timed during a
holiday season to afford the plaintiffs only a short opportunity to investigate. The
defendants had also exploited the plaintiffs' confidence in the defendant representative in
order to further the fraud.
99. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977).
100. Id., at 694. The Tenth Circuit had written a prior opinion five months earlier which
was withdrawn following the Hochfelder decision. See [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,465 (Feb. 27, 1976). In the withdrawn opinion, the court had held
that the plaintiff was barred from recovery by his lack of due diligence in not investigating
the financial status of the company. While recognizing the rarity of the due care defense
in intentional conduct situations, the court felt that since the plaintiff was a sophisticated
investor, his failure to investigate could not be overlooked. Id. at 99,363.
101. 545 F.2d at 689.
102. Id. at 691.
103. Id. at 692, 694. The court said that "[jlust as contributory negligence is not a
defense to an intentional tort case of fraud, similarly due diligence is totally inapposite in
the context of intentional conduct required to be proved under Rule l0b-5."Id. at 694.
104. Id. at 693.
105. Id. at 694.
106. Id. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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defendant." 107 While not stating a basis for this apparent undercutting of
the strength of its holding, the court implied that it would modify its
position in extreme situations where the plaintiff's conduct was shown to
have been as flagrant as defendant's.
The Holdsworth court also noted the distinction the Tenth Circuit has
made in the past 0 8 between holding the plaintiff to a due care standard,
and examining the plaintiff's background in order to determine whether
reliance was justified.'19 Thus, even though lack of due care will not be
recognized as a separate defense, the plaintiff's conduct and business
acumen will remain relevant to the reasonableness of his reliance." 
0
In early 1977, the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem-
ical Corp."' examined the due care requirement in the context of
recklessness under the scienter requirement. The issue arose in connec-
tion with a proposed corporate merger during which the defendants
allegedly misrepresented and omitted certain material facts concerning
the financial condition of the target company."' The district court had
found that the defendants had "deliberately, or at best, recklessly,
misrepresented" the true financial conditions." 3
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the finding of 10b-5 liability, since
there was sufficient reckless conduct to meet the scienter requirement of
Hochfelder.114 But the defendants were not allowed to assert the plain-
tiff's lack of due care as a defense."' At common law, recklessness was
sufficient to support a cause of action for fraud or deceit, making a
claimant's negligence as irrelevant to recklessness as it would be to
actions carried out with specific intent to deceive."
6
Despite adopting common law distinctions to bar the use of due care as
a defense, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless considered the plaintiff's
actions when analyzing the separate defense of nonreliance.117 To rebut
107. 545 F.2d at 693.
108. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
109. 545 F.2d at 695-96.
110. Id. at 697. The court thus perpetuated the confusion between questions of reliance
and questions of due care.
111. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 225 (1977).
112. Id. at 1037.
113. Id. at 1039.
114. Id. at 1040. The court cited Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993-94 (7th
Cir. 1976).
115. 553 F.2d at 1040.
116. Id. at 1044.
117. Id. at 1049. Thus this court also confuses due care with reliance. In another recent
case, due care was confused with causation when the court said that "plaintiff cannot
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a presumption of reliance on the omission made, the defendant was
required to show that the plaintiff had constructive knowledge of the
omitted information. Hinging constructive knowledge upon the plain-
tiff's ability to have discovered the truth, the court noted that prior to
Hochfelder, a lack of care under negligence standards would have
sufficed to charge the plaintiff with knowledge."' The court, however,
relying on the Holdsworth dictum,119 found that following Hochfelder a
plaintiff must be shown to have exhibited more than mere lack of care:
gross or highly unreasonable conduct would be required. 120 But the court
found no recklessness in the plaintiff's investigation of the situation. 
121
Thus, the court apparently distinguished the affirmative defense of due
care from the use of a claimant's actions to determine justifiable reliance.
By using the plaintiff's conduct as a factor in judging the reasonableness
of his reliance, the court incorporated due care into its determination of
1Ob-5 liability while invalidating due care as a separate defense.
A few months after Sundstrand, the Fifth Circuit in Dupuy v.
Dupuy' 22 took the opposite approach, and recognized lack of due care as
a separate defense to recklessness if the plaintiff acted not with mere
negligence, but with a recklessness comparable to that of the defend-
ant.' 23 The claimant sued his brother, alleging misrepresentation and
omission of material facts concerning the financial condition of a com-
pany jointly owned by them in order to induce the plaintiff to sell his
stock at an unreasonably low price. 24 The court held that theire was
adequate evidence upon which the jury125 could have found fraud by the
defendant. 26 Once establishing that the defendant was liable under rule
claim reliance if it failed to exercise the due diligence required of it by law." NBI
Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,066, at 91,801 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
118. 553 F.2d at 1048.
119. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 1600 (1977).
120. 553 F.2d at 1048.
121. Id.
122. 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977).
123. Id. at 1020.
124. Id. at 1007.
125. At trial, the jury found that the plaintiff had acted with sufficient care to warrant
judgment in his favor. However, the trial judge disagreed and gave judgment n.o.v. to the
defendant. Id. at 1007-08.
126. The defendant, having active management of the company, knew well in advance
of his statements to the plaintiff that the company had made a very profitable agreement
with a development company, greatly increasing the company's worth. The defendant had
hidden the information from his brother and led him to believe that financial arrangements
on the deal were at a standstill. The plaintiff, being in ill health, became apprehensive over
his investment and asked his brother to buy him out. Id. at 1011.
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lOb-5, the court went on to consider the effect of the plaintiff's lack of
care on the recovery.1
27
The court decided to follow the approach it had taken in Clement A.
Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,128 and treated due care as an element separate
from the issue of defendant's liability. 129 The court's choice was influ-
enced by the need to establish consistent standards of conduct for defend-
ants in 10b-5 actions, and to avoid confusion between private 10b-5
proceedings and SEC enforcement proceedings. 30 Since private actions
under rule 10b-5 have the same statutory basis as SEC enforcement
proceedings, the same standard of conduct should be imposed upon
defendants in both types of action. 3' A victim's conduct should thus be
as irrelevant to liability in private actions as it is in SEC proceedings.1
32
Since the duty of full disclosure is theoretically owed to the public rather
than to any individual investor, the preclusion of a particular plaintiff
from recovery should not affect an independent determination of whether
a violation of the Act has occurred. 133
The Dupuy court was also convinced that tying due care to considera-
tions of materiality and reliance, as some circuits have done, 134 would
bring about inconsistencies between the application of due care in cases
involving misrepresentation-induced fraud, and those involving omis-
sion-induced fraud.135 In omissions cases, relating due care to reliance
would result in the courts' ignoring a claimant's responsibility to invest
with caution, since after Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 136
reliance need no longer be proven in such cases. 137 The court argued that
policies of promoting investor care and good faith "do not vanish in
omissions cases." 1
38
Having decided to approach due care as a separate element, the court
went on to analyze the effect of the Hochfelder scienter requirement
upon its continued application in rule 10b-5 actions. Several theories
support a continuation of the common law distinction between the effect
127. Id. at 1013.
128. 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). See text accom-
panying notes 77-78 supra.
129. 551 F.2d at 1014-15.
130. Id. at 1015.
131. Id.
132. Id. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
133. 551 F.2d at 1015. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
135. 551 F.2d at 1016.
136. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
137. 551 F.2d at 1015-16. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
138. 551 F.2d at 1015-16.
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of a plaintiff's negligence in intentional tort actions and in negligent tort
actions. First, the policy of discouraging intentional misconduct is much
greater than that of discouraging negligent conduct, in light of the
judicial shift away from the concept of caveat emptor in the securities
field. 139 Second, comparative culpability plays a large part in determin-
ing which party should bear the loss.14° A victim's negligence will be
evaluated where it corresponds to the defendant's behavior, but will be
disregarded where there is a more culpable intentional act by the defend-
ant. 14 1 The court found that nothing in securities law policy would
preclude this judicial allocation of loss.142
Until Hochfelder, the due care requirement had been an important
mechanism for lessening the potential liability of people handling securi-
ties transactions. 143 The requirement of scienter, however, limits the risk
of liability to conduct which is in some way intentional, thus decreasing
the importance of the due care defense in limiting rule 1Ob-5 recovery. 144
Since most cases prior to Hochfelder did not require the victim to show
due care where intentional fraud was found, they can be viewed as
consistent with the common law dichotomy. 145
Ultimately, the Dupuy court held that following Hochfelder, the due
care concept would be altered consistent with tort law and the policies of
the federal securities laws, so that a successful defense requires proof that
the claimant exhibited a lack of care at least as culpable as the defend-
ant's."4 Thus, since recklessness is the minimum form of conduct
recognized under scienter definitions," the defendant must now prove at
least reckless conduct by a claimant before recovery can be barred.1
48
Using this standard, the Fifth Circuit looked at whether the plaintiff
had "intentionally refused to investigate 'in disregard of a risk known to
him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so
139. Id. at 1018. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963),
the Supreme Court stated that the 1934 Act and its companion provisions contained a
"fundamental purpose. . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry." Id. at 186.
140. 551 F.2d at 1018.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1019.
143. Id. See note 43 supra.
144. 551 F.2d at 1019.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1020.
147. Id. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
148. In McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976), the court
recognized due care as a defense to reckless misconduct without indicating that anything
more than a showing of negligence by the plaintiff was required.
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great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.' " 149 Under
the circumstances, the plaintiff was held to have acted reasonably in
selling his stock, and was not reckless.
5 °
Il. FACTORS AFFECTING THE EXTENT OF THE DUE CARE REQUIREMENT
Regardless of the circuits' approach to due care, there are several
factual considerations that will affect the extent of an individual claim-
ant's duty of care.151 The courts will hold a claimant to an objective
standard of care by requiring that he exercise the degree of care that a
person of similar background and depth of knowledge would have exer-
cised in those circumstances.152 For the average investor, this standard
requires the common sense and good judgment of the reasonable person
having no particular experience or expertise in the investment field.
153
Such ordinary investors will be held to an understanding of elementary
technical information, 154 and any knowledge contained in easily available
current market sheets.
155
Among the factors deemed relevant to the plaintiff's obligation are:
access to the information and opportunity to detect the fraud; 56 the way
in which the fraud was concealed; 57 the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties; 58 the existence of a long standing business or
149. 551 F.2d at 1020 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 22, § 34, at 185).
150. Id. at 1020-24.
151. The factors most commonly used by the courts were first set down by the Fifth
Circuit in Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 988 (1971), in the context of the district court's jury instructions:
[Ilt is impossible to lay down any general rule as to the amount of evidence or number
or nature of evidential facts admitting discovery of fraud. But, facts in the sense of
indisputable proof or any proof at all, are different from facts calculated to excite
inquiry which impose a duty of reasonable diligence and which, if pursued, would
disclose the fraud. Facts calculated to excite inquiry merely constitute objects of
direct experience and, as such, may comprise rumors or vague charges if of sufficient
substance to arouse suspicion. Thus, the duty of reasonable diligence is an obligation
imposed by law solely under the peculiar circumstances of each case, including
existence of a fiduciary relationship, concealment of the fraud, opportunity to detect
it, position in the industry, sophistication and expertise in the financial community,
and knowledge of related proceedings.
Id. at 102.
152. See McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1077 (D. Del. 1976).
153. See Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690, 705,707 (M.D. Fla.
1974). See generally DUKE, supra note 13, at 775.
154. Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
155. Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965).
156. See authorities cited notes 8-9 supra.
157. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1967);
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
158. See Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974).
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personal relationship between the parties;'59 and whether it was the
plaintiff who initiated the sale or sought to rush its progress. 160 Two other
factors which have been given considerable importance by the courts are
the plaintiff's sophistication and experience in the investment field, and
the nature of the plaintiff's position within the industry. 6'
A. Sophisticated Investors
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has been interpreted to afford
relief not only to the gullible and unsophisticated investor, but to the
knowledgeable and experienced one as well. 162 A sophisticated investor is
also entitled to reasonable reliance on the honesty of the people he deals
with, since "integrity is still the mainstay of commerce . '.'.."163
However, an investor with vast business experience or valuable exper-
tise in the investment field may have constructive knowledge of the risks
inherent in certain transactions, regardless of any actual knowledge of the
fraud. 16 Such an investor would be held to a greater duty to investigate
the truth than a person who lacks such sophistication. 16 An investor who
159. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1967).
160. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977);
Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
161. See generally DUKE, supra note 13.
162. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
Compare Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974) (unsophisticated investor) with
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976) (sophisticated investor) and
Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (sophisticated investor).
163. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976). Accord, Stier v. Smith,
473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).
164. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F.
Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal.
1975); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds,
533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa.
1973), affl'd, 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974). DUKE, supra note 13, at 768, noted that
confirmation slips and monthly statements from a brokerage firm have been found
sufficient to give a customer-plaintiff of slight sophistication notice of the risks involved
in the transactions. See Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974);
Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002
(1973); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955).
165. See Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [Current Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057
(D. Del. 1976); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Jackson
v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on othergrounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d
Cir. 1976); DUKE, supra note 13, at 768.
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has extensive investment experience, or whose occupation gives him
relevant business acumen, 166 must take positive and reasonable action to
ascertain the true facts.1 67 Failure to do so by acting in disregard of the
facts or in haste will bar any recovery. 168
Nevertheless, where the sophisticated investor lacks access to the
information or the opportunity to discover the fraud, recovery will not be
barred. 169 In such a situation, the experience and sophistication of the
investor is of little value in preventing the fraud. In McLean v. Alexan-
der,170 an investor experienced in corporate acquisitions and mergers was
held to be a sophisticated investor, 171 and as such had the duty to make
reasonable investigations into the financial status of the company. 172 But
the court alowed him to rely on a current certified financial statement
without requiring him to "function as a private detective in ferreting out
the true facts on which the accountant's representations [were] made."
7 3
The court demanded merely that the plaintiff be shown to have acted
reasonably in the circumstances.
1 74
B. Insiders
A plaintiff whose position as a corporate officer, director, or substan-
tiai shareholder gives him special access to corporate affairs will have a
greater responsibility to discover the true facts surrounding a transfer
than would an ordinary investor. 175 Although some courts find that a
166. See John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800,804 (5th Cir. 1971) (recovery by
sophisticated investor not barred where his expertise did not relate to the subject of the
misrepresentation).
167. See Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976); Eichen v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Lane v.
Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (sophisticated investor
should demand most recent financial information reasonably available to him).
168. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 402 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
169. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Stier v. Smith, 473
F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973); John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1971);
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
170. 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
171. Id. at 1078.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1079.
174. Id.
175. See Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); City Nat'l Bank v.
Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Myzel v. Fields,
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plaintiff's corporate status makes him an "insider" as a matter of law,
176
most look beyond the corporate title and examine the extent of the
plaintiff's association with the business affairs of the corporation.177 An
insider who normally has ready access to corporate books, records, and
minutes, is chargeable with knowledge of any information which could
have been reasonably discovered from those sources. 178 A failure to
investigate easily available sources will bar the corporate insider from
recovery under rule lOb-5.179
Normally one insider may not recover from another insider, since
under rule 10b-5 persons with equal access to information generally owe
no such duty to one another. 180 Where the parties have equal access to the
relevant information and there is no attempt to hide or misconstrue the
truth, no violation of rule 1Ob-5 can occur. 181 However, recovery cannot
be barred if the plaintiff lacked the opportunity to discover the fraud,182
as where the information was held exclusively by the defendant,183 or the
nature of the plaintiff's position precluded effective access.1"4
386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd
on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); DUKE, supra note 13, at 762.
176. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
177. See Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other
grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878
(W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84
(E.D. Mich. 1972).
178. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
(dicta); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds,
533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976).
179. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
993 (1976) (dicta); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on
other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (dicta).
180. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970).
181. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 533
F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd, 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974).
182. See Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
183. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
993 (1976) (information contained in another insider's personal files); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) ("labyrinthine transfers" hidden
from plaintiff insider).
184. In Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1022-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312
(1977), the court refused to raise the plaintiff's duty of care on the basis of his corporate
title alone, reasoning that it is not the title that is important, but the access to information
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Running against the general trend of the circuits with respect to an
insider's duty of care is Holdsworth v. Strong, 185 in which one of the
plaintiffs, who was both an accountant and an attorney, was found to be a
sophisticated insider.186 It may be assumed that the reasonable close
corporate shareholder with such a background would have used his
position to check the financial status of the company and to determine its
earning capabilities personally before divesting his stock-regardless of
personal friendships involved.1 87 The court ruled that the failure to
exercise due care would no longer be recognized as a defense to fraud,
and allowed the plaintiff to recover in spite of his sophistication and
experience.188 The decision ignores the long-standing expectation that
this type of investor would more reasonably be aware of the risks to his
interests if he failed to re-check what his co-investor told him. This
application of common law distinctions to exclude the victim's back-
ground seems to ignore the policy of furthering investor caution and the
equitable principles of fairness.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, in the five circuits which have considered the plaintiff's due
care requirement in rule lOb-5 actions since the Hochfelder decision,
three courts have continued to hold it valid,189 while two have eliminated
it as a separate element, although continuing to tie it to reliance ques-
tions. 19 Thus, it can safely be said that the due care requirement will not
that such a position gives the victim. The court found that the plaintiff's failure to
investigate properly was due to physical and emotional stress caused by the disease from
which he was suffering at the time, and to his faith in his brother's judgment.
185. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1600 (1977).
186. Id. at 692.
187. Id. at 690-91. The trial court had relied on the close friendship between the parties.
188. Id. at 689, 692.
189. Hirsch v. Du Pont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d
Cir. 1976); NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [Current Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del.
1976).
190. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 225 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
1600 (1977).
Recently, in dissent to the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court in Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 312 (1977), Justice White recognized the
divergence of opinion over the due care requirement following Hochfelder. He noted the
"existing uncertainty as to the proper standard of care required of plaintiffs after Ernst &
Ernst," and stressed the need for clarification, saying that "[b]usiness can be transacted
more freely and efficiently if the responsibility for verifying underlying facts is clearly
allocated." 98 S. Ct. at 313.
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vanish with implementation of the Hochfelder scienter requirement. Due
to the widespread recognition of due care as a defense and the strong
policy reasons behind it, the courts will be reluctant to do away with it so
quickly. Instead, most courts have relaxed a claimant's standard of
conduct such that in order to recover, a victim need only avoid reckless-
ness in investment transactions. Mere negligence by an investor will no
longer prevent recovery.
Although the circuits continue to employ due care in diverse ways, its
usage as a separate element, independent of reliance and the defendant's
duty to disclose, is the more effective and theoretically sound approach.
Application of due care in such a way will bring about greater consisten-
cy in actions brought under rule 10b-5 and insure its continued value to
equitable judicial resolution of securities litigation.
Judith Woodward

